proposed a new cryptanalytic method that combines algebraic and differential cryptanalysis. They introduced three new attacks, namely Attack A, Attack B and Attack C. For Attack A, they explain that the time complexity is difficult to determine. The goal of Attacks B and C is to filter out wrong pairs and then recover the key. In this paper, we show that Attack C does not provide an advantage over differential cryptanalysis for typical block ciphers, because it cannot be used to filter out any wrong pairs that satisfy the ciphertext differences. Furthermore, we explain why Attack B provides no advantage over differential cryptanalysis for PRESENT. We verify our results for PRESENT experimentally, using both PolyBoRi and Min-iSat. Our work helps to understand which equations are important in the differential-algebraic attack. Based on our findings, we present two new differential-algebraic attacks. Using the first method, our attack on 15-round PRESENT-80 requires 2 59 chosen plaintexts and has a worstcase time complexity of 2 73.79 equivalent encryptions. Our new attack on 14-round PRESENT-128 requires 2 55 chosen plaintexts and has a worstcase time complexity of 2 112.83 equivalent encryptions. Although these attacks have a higher time complexity than the differential attacks, their data complexity is lower.
Introduction
Differential cryptanalysis [6, 7] is one of classic cryptanalytic methods for block ciphers. Resistance against differential cryptanalysis is a typical design criterion for new block ciphers. Algebraic cryptanalysis is a general method to attack ciphers. It has been widely used to cryptanalyze many primitives such as stream ciphers [13, 16] , multivariate cryptosystems [19] and in particular block ciphers [14, 15, 17, 22] . The basic idea of algebraic cryptanalysis is to express the block cipher as a large multivariate polynomial system of equations. The secret key of the cipher is the solution of this system of equations. If the system is very sparse, overdefined or structured, it may be solved faster than a generic non-linear system of equations. By solving the system of equations for the block cipher, the key can be recovered with only a few plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
There are several methods to solve these systems of equations, such as computing a Gröbner basis or using a SAT solver. To compute a Gröbner basis, PolyBoRi [11] can be used. MiniSat [18] is a fast SAT solver. The advantage of computing a Gröbner basis is that useful equations can be generated, but this computation is typically slower than using a SAT solver and can more easily run out of memory.
However, the feasibility of algebraic cryptanalysis against block ciphers still remains a source of speculation. The main problem is that the size of the corresponding algebraic system is so large (thousands of variables and equations) that it seems infeasible to correctly predict the complexity of solving such polynomial systems. Therefore, algebraic cryptanalysis has so far had limited success in targeting modern block ciphers.
Recently, some works combining statistical cryptanalysis and algebraic cryptanalysis were presented [2-4, 20, 26] . Specifically, the combination of differential cryptanalysis and algebraic cryptanalysis appears to offer an advantage in reducing the data complexity. In [2, 3] , Albrecht et al. propose new differentialalgebraic cryptanalytic methods, which they refer to as Attack A, Attack B and Attack C. In order to describe them, let p denote the probability of the r-round differential characteristic for an N -round block cipher.
In Attack A, the system of equations consists of the equations of the plaintext bits, ciphertext bits, and subkey bits, the equations of the key schedule, and the linear equations resulting from the differential characteristic and the filter equations of the last (N − r) rounds (i.e. the equations that must hold if the output difference after round r holds). Attack A recovers the key by solving this system of equations for each of the about 1/p plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
In Attack B, the same system of equations is used. The longest time to find that the system of equations is inconsistent, is measured. If this time is exceeded, a right pair is found with a high probability.
In Attack C, the system of equations only consists of the filter equations after r rounds for an r-round differential and the key schedule algorithm after r rounds. The conditions resulting from the differential characteristic and the conditions from the plaintext to the corresponding ciphertext are omitted in Attack C. The goal of Attack C in [3] is to filter out wrong pairs by solving the system of
